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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

L. P. BENTLEY and CLARICE E.

)

B~nn,

>
)

Plaintiff, )
Respondents}

vs.

}
) Case No. 18241
)

LOWELL E. POTTER,

)

Defendant, )
Appellant, )

APPELLANT LOWELL E. POTTER'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action which was commenced in the the Third
Judicial District Court, based upon the alleged breach of a
Mining Lease executed between the parties on the 11th day of
May,

1978,

($1,000.00)
sold

a

and

for

the

sum

of

one

thousand

dollars

as a result of the Plaintiff-Respondent having

truck

to

Mining

and

Energy

Leasing

corporation.

Defendant-Appellant counterclaimed for assessment work which
had been performed, and for the value of a trailer taken by
the Plaintiff-Respondent.
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DISPOSITION I'N THE LOWER COURT

The

case

was

tried

before

the

Honorable

Wilkinson on the 13th day of October, 1981.

Homer

F.

On the 18th day

of December, 1981, the court entered a memorandum decision
stating that Plaintiff-Respondent was entitled to a

total

judgment against the Defendant-Appellant for $19~375.46 and
that Defendant-Appellant was entitled to a

credit against

said amount o·f $5, 120. 00; thereby granting Judgment to the
Plaintiff-Respondent in the sum of· $14, 255. 46.
On the
Findings

of

11th day
Fact

of

January,

1982

the

and Conclusions of Law,

court
and a

entered
Judgment

against the Plaintiff-Respondent in the sum of $19,375.46.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Appellant
courts

Judgment

and

an

seeks

a

order

Respondent has no standing for
against

Defendant-Appellant,

reversal
stating

of
that

the

lower

Plaintiff-

the bringing of an action

and

that

the

contract

in

question was void or voidable.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On

May

11,

1978

Plaintiff-Respondent

and

Defendant-

Appellant entered into a Mining Lease and Option; whereupon
Plaintiff-Respondent was the Lessor and Defendant-Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was the Lessee (Exhibit 1).

Section I of said Lease Agree-

ment at page 2 indicated:
"The rights hereby granted include the lodes,
veins, beds, dumps, and other occurances of the
lease minerals within the boundry of the lease
premises."
(emphasis added).
However Plaintiff-Respondent never had an interest in the
lode claims and only attempted to perfect the placer claims
(Exhibit 14).

Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged that he was

aware of the difference between a lode and placer claim.
(Transcript page

46

lines

19 through

25,

page

48

and

49

(Exhibit 1) ,

in

lines 21 through 25 and 1 through 17).
Section VIII of the Lease at page 6

connection with termination of the Lease Agreement, requires
the Lessor to tender notice to the Lessee, and states:
"
. • if such default continues for a period of
60 days after written notice of such default has
been given by the lessor's to the lessee then in
such event this lease shall be terminable."
Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged that he

never made

demand for payment under said Lease Agreement

(Transcript

page 16, lines 19 through 21) and that the methods employed
in doing the assessment work, and exploration on the property
in

question

were

acceptable

to

the

Plaintiff-Respondent

(Page 38, lines 16 through 25, and page 39 lines 1 through
5),

and at

the

first

time

Plaintiff-Respondent

indicated

that there should be a termination of the Lease Agreement in
question, or that the work was improper was on March 5, 1980
(Transcript page 65 lines 10 through 18), which was after
the date suit had been filed by Plaintiff-Respondent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That

Plaintiff-Respondent

initiated

suit

against

the

Defendant-Appellant on November 29, 1979, and a summons and
Complaint was served upon the Defendant-Appellant on December
14,

1979,

and that on March 5,

1980 Plaintiff-Respondent

filed a Notice of Termination (Exhibit 13).
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, a judge of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, found that the August 10, 1979 letter (Exhibit 2)
was

a

notice

of default pursuant to the

lease

agreement

(Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact) , and that the filing
of the legal action on the 29th day of November, 1979 was
written notice of termination of the Lease sufficient to
grant standing to the Plaintiff-Respondent for the bringing
of an action.

The Plaintiff-Respondent was awarded judgment

against the Defendant-Appellant based on a termination and
damages under the Lease.
At the time of the placement of the overburden complained of by

Plaintiff-Respondent

it appears

that Plaintiff-

Respondent was aware of the placement of the overburden and
made regular trips throughout the area

(Transcript page 54

line 20 and 21, page 176 lines 18 through 20, page 177 lines
23 through 25, page 182 lines 17 through 18 pages 174, 176,
177, and 182), and the court found pursuant to paragraph 13
of

the

findings

of

fact

that

Plaintiff-Respondent

was

present during the placement of the overburden.
The Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged
71

and

72)

that

prior

to

an

(Transcript page

execution of

the

lease
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in

question with the Defendant-Appellant that a former co-owner
of

the

claims,

claims,
and

a

a
new

Mr.

Tony

Fisher

co-owner

Mrs.

was

removed

Clarice

E.

from

the

Bentley

was

placed upon the claims in question without the filing of any
notification to the B.L.M ••
Plaintiff-Respondent sold a.truck for a total purchase
price of $5,000.00 to Mining and Energy Leasing Corporation,
a Utah corporation (Exhibit 15, transcript pages 81 through
84), and that there was a balance due and owing as a result
of said sale in the sum of $1,000.00.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE LEASE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE IN DEFAULT UNTIL WRITTEN
NOTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN, PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE LEASE;
AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAS NO STANDING TO SUE UNTIL SAID
NOTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN.

The Lease Agreement in question,

under Section VIII,

Termination, at page 6 states:
"If, at any time, the Lessee shall be in default
in the performance of any of the terms and conditions of this Lease on the part of the Lessee to
be performed, • • • and if such default continues
for a period of 60 days after written notice of
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_c:;._

such default has been given by the Lessor to the
Lessee, then, and in such event, this Lease shall
be terminable.
Such termination shall -be effective as of the date of the Lessors' written notice
to the Lessee terminating the same." (emphasis
added).
In the action presently before the court it appears
undisputed

that

Plaintiff-Respondent made

no

demand

upon

Defendant-Appellant for performance of the Lease in que_stion, or notified the Defendant-Appellant that the lease was
in default,

(Transcript page 16 lines 19 and 20, and page 65

lines 14 through 18).

The purported default or termination

of the Lease pursuant to the August 10, 1979 letter (Exhibit
2) , is in actuality not a notice of a default of the Lease,
and

is

contrary

to

the

provisions

of

the

Lease by

the

granting of ten days notice which is contrary to the provisions of Section VIII of the Lease Agreement.

A perusal

of the record in question will indicate that the Complaint
was signed by the Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney on November
29,

1979

and was

served upon

December 14, 1979.

the

Defendant-Appellant on

It is also undisputed from the record,

and the testimony of the Plaintiff-Respondent that the first
notice of default or termination tendered to the DefendantAppellant,
after

was

tendered by

suit had been

filed,

Plaintiff-Respondents
and was

attorney

tendered on March S,

1980, (Transcript page 65 lines 14-18).
It is clear from the Complaint and Amended Complaints
on

file

herein

that

Plaintiff-Respondent

is

alleging

a

breach of the Lease Agreement in question and is stating
that Defendant-Appellant failed to comply with the terms of
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the Lease after a termination thereof.
have

specifically

agreed

in

the

However, the parties
Lease

Agreement

that

Defendant-Appellant should have the opportunity of correcting any default for a period of 60 days after written notice
of default has been given, and Defendant-Appellant was never
given the opportunity to cure said alleged default.
The law in connection with contracts seems clear that
if a contract provides for notice that said notice must be
given before performance or damages under the contract can
be enforced.

This proposition is clearly set out in 17 Am

Jur 2d Section 356 at page 794 which states:

~·

al

.nt

"A contract
specifically
requiring
a
notice
calling for, or a demand for, performance cannot
be enforced unless a notice or demand provided for
has either been given or waived."
also in 17 Am Jur 2d Section 357 at page 796 it states
"There can be no recovery on a contract specif ically providing for notice or demand unless the
notice or demand was given in accordance with the
terms of the contract.".
As is clear from the case presently before the court the
parties very specifically contracted for written notice to
be given by the Lessor to the Lessee, and that the Lessee
had the opportunity of curing said default for a period of
60 days,

(Exhibit 1, Section VIII).

However, Lessee was not

given notice prior to the institution of suit, and suit was
unilaterally filed without complaining with the provisions
of the Lease Agreement by Plaintiff-Respondent.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Bethers -v- Wood,

10 U 2d

313, 352 P 2d 774 (1960} holds at page 775 in interpretating
contracts:
"The correct rule would appear to be that the
question is to solved by the intent of the parties
as determined by proper construction of their
contract.".
It is evident from the contract in question that the
parties intended the Lessor to provide written notice to the
Lessee, and it is clear from the testimony of the PlaintiffRespondent,

that

notice

institution of suit,

was

not

(Transcript

given

until

after

the

page 65 lines -14 through

18) •
The Utah Supreme Court in Peterson -v- Intermountain
Capital Corporation,

29 U 2d 271,

508 P 2d 536,

(1973),

recognizance that Defendant-Appellant should be allowed the
opportunity to perform pursuant to the terms of the contract,
and in quoting Corbin on Contracts at page 538, the court
stated:
"At Section 978 of Corbin on Contracts it is stated:
'In an action for breach by an unconditional
repudiation it is still a condition precedent to
the plaintiff's right to a Judgment for damages
that he should have the ability to perform all
such conditions.
If he could not or would not
have performed the substantially equivalent for
which the defendant's performance was agreed to be
exchanged, he is given no remedy in damages for
the Defendants nonperformance or repudiation •

"
This proposition is further substantiated by the Utah
Supreme Court in Bastain vs. Cedar Hills Inv. and Land co.
623 P 2d 818

(1981)

wherein the Utah Supreme Courth held

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that a buyer could not recover damages
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,_ __

promise

being

contingent

upon

conditions

that

had

not

occurred and it is evident from the case before the court
that the Lessor did not tender the required written notice
pursuant to the Lease Agreement in question.
Court in so holding reaffirmed Peterson vs.

The Supreme
Intermountain

Capital Corp. supra.
Willison on Contracts, Third Edition, Section 887B at
pages 513, 514, and 515 states:
"Where notice is required in the contract, the
nature of the notice will normally be governed by
the terms expressed or implied, of the agreement
between the parties
In the absence of a
conflict with law or public policy, parties may
contract how notice shall be given; when they do
so contract, the giving of notice by the method
agreed upon is sufficient whether it results in
actual notice or not.".
In the case before the court it is clear that no notice
was given al though Section VIII on Terminat.ion specifically
provides how notice is to be given by the Lessor, and that
the Lessee should have 60 days in which to cure any alleged
default.

POINT II

PLAINTIFF-RESONDENT DID NOT TENDER CONSIDERATION FOR
EXECUTION OF THE LEASE IN QUESTION.

The law of contracts is clear that in order for there
to be a binding, valid contract consideration must be given.
The Utah Supreme Court clearly recognizes this proposition
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of law in General Insurance Company of America -v- Carnicero
Dynasty Corporation, 545 P 2d 502 (1976) , and states at page
504:
"Where consideration is lacking there can be no
contract. Where consideration fails, there was a
contract when the agreement was made, but because
of some superviening cause the promised performance fails. 0 •
In the action presently before the court it is clear
under page

2 of the Lease and as

Lease the Lessor

is granting the

stated pursuant to the
lodes and veins of the

property in question.

However, the evidence produced at the

time

that

of

trial

shows

Plaintif £-Respondent

never

had

title to the lodes or veins in question but merely filed on
the Placer Claims,

(Exhibit 14).

Under page 9 of the Lease in question the Lessors are
required

to

record

all

of

the

unpatented mining

claims

subject to the Lease in accordance with appropriate State
and Federal statutes and regulations.

However, at the time

of the trial the evidence clearly showed that the PlaintiffRespondents had not filed a

notice in conjunction with the

transfer of interest with the B.L.M.

Even as of the date of

trial no Notice of transfer of interest was filed,

(Tran-

script page 72 lines 4 through 7), and a Notice of Interest
is required to be filed by 43 CFR 3833.3(a) on unpatented
mining claims.
From the evidence produced at trial Plaintiffs stated
that

they

owned

the

unpatented mining

claims

located
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on

Federal lands prior to October 21, 1976,
lines

9

through

13) ,

and

therefore

(~ran~cript

page 9

Plaintiff-Respondents

should have filed all proper documentation with the B.L.M.
on or before October 22, 1979, and on the following calandar
years thereafter.
The Lease at page 9 also provides:
"The Lessor shall record each and all of the
unpatented mining claims subject to this lease by
December
1,
1978
in
accordance
with
the
appropriate federal statutes and regulations."
A requirement to file with the B.L.M. is imposed upon
the owners of unpatiented mining claims pursuant to 43 CFR
3833.2-1 and it appears that a failure to file an instrument
or to comply with the federal regulations in connection with
unpatented mining claims voids title to the claims as stated
under 43 CFR 3833.4 wherein it states:
(a) The failure to file an instrument required by
Section 3833.1-2 a, b, and 3833.2-1 of this title
within the time periods described herein shall be
deemed conclusively to be construed as an abandon of
the mine claim, mill, or tunnel sight, and it shall be
void."(emphasis added).
It therefore appears that because of Plaintiff-Respondents
failure

to own the

interest granted,

and because of

failure to perfect the mining claims in question
14),

pursuant to the

lease and federal

the

(Exhibit

regulations,

that

Plaintiff-Respondents actually had no interest to transfer,
therefore there was a complete lack of consideration and a
valid

contract

could

not

be

entered

into

between

the

Plaintiff and Defendant.
The perfecting of title of the claims was a condition
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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precedent

to

the

performance

by

Defendant-Appellant

as

discussed in Point I in connection with the Notice requirement.

In General Insurance Company of America -v- Carnicero

Dynasty Corporation,

supra at page

505

the

Utah

Supreme

Court states:
"However consideration or a substitute thereof
must be established as part of Plaintiffs prima
facia case in a contract action."
This

proposition

of

law

is

also

supported

by

the

Supreme Court in Bastian vs. Cedar Hills Inv. and Land Co.
supra.
In the action presently before the court, because of
Plaintiff-Respondents failure to file the proper documentation, there is no interest owned by Plaintiff-Respondents in
connection

with

the

mining

claims,

and

the

fact

that

Plaintiff-Respondents attempted to lease out lode and vein
claims upon which he never had title is a complete lack of
consideration.

POINT III

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLACEMENT OF
THE OVERBURDEN AND MADE NO ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE SAME REMOVED
AND MUST BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF
THE PLACEMENT THEREOF.

The Utah Supreme Court in Thompson vs. Jacobsen 463 p
2d 801

(1970)

has stated that a

fundamental principal of
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law is that the Plaintiff has a duty to reasonably mitigate
damages.

The Utah Supreme Court in University

Club vs.

Invesco Holding Corporation 504 P 2d 29 (1972) stated:
"The recognized rule is that where one party
definitely indicates that he cannot or will not
perform a condition of a contract, the other is
not required to uselessly abide time, but may act
upon
the
breached
condition.
Indeed
in
appropriate circumstances he ought to do so to
mitigate damages."(emphasis added).
In the action presently before the court it is clear
that Plaintiff-Respondent was aware of the placement of the
overburden

and

made

regular

trips

throughout

the

area

(Findings of Fact paragraph 13, Transcript page 54 line 20
and 21,

page 176 lines 18 through 20,

page 177 lines 23

through 25, page 182 lines 17 through 18 pages 174, 176, 177
and 182), and in fact Defendant-Respondent went further and
indicated that the methods employed in doing the assement
work

and

acceptable

exploration
to the

on

the

property

Plaintiff-Respondent

through 25, page 39 lines 1 through 5).

in

question

(page

38

were

lines

16

It appears clear

that in the circumstances presently before the court that
Plaintiff-Respondent had a duty to mitigate damages but at
no time has he attempted to mitigate damages as a result of
the placement of the overburden on the mineral properties in
question.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IV

THE

JUDGMENT

FOR REMOVAL

OF

THE

OLD

OVERBURDEN WAS

EXCESSIVE.

The court on the trial held on October 13, 1981 granted
a Judgment to the Plaintiff for the removal of overburden
which had been placed upon suspected deposits of aragonite.However, from the Transcript it appears that the deposits of
aragonite
removed

uncovered

by

Defendants

exploration

could

be

(Transcript 115 lines 19 through 24) , but that the

reason for not removing said deposits of aragonite which had
been uncovered by the Defendant-Appellant was because of a
lack of market for the same and the fact that said aragonite
is located to far from a metropolitan area (Transcript page
129, 130, 131).

The Utah Supreme Court in Even Odds, Inc. vs. Nielson
448 P 2d 709 (1968) at page 711 stated:
"Speaking generally about damages, the desired
objective is to evaluate any loss suffered by the
most direct, practical and accurate method that
can be employed."
The Utah Supreme Court in Winters vs. Charles Anthony, Inc.
586

P

2d

453

(1978)

held

that

ordinarily

in

regards

to

personal property that the general rule for damages is the
fair market value or, if there is no demand for the item,
the recovery is based on actual value.

The court further

stated:
"The rule is a flexible one that can be modified
in the interest of fairness."
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In the action presently before the court there is no
market for the aragonite in question and the overburden was
placed by the Defendant-Appellant, with the knowledge of the
Plaintiff-Respondent
182) •

It

further

(Transcript
appears

page

that

174,

the

176,

placement

177,

and

of

the

overburden was in the logical place for the _same (Transcript
page 218) •

It therefore appears that said overburden was

placed at the
that

the

direction of

the Plaintiff-Respondent,

and

placement was based upon an exploration of

the

properties and not full scaled mining.

It therefore appears

that the placement of the overburden has not damaged the
in

Plaintiff-Respondent because

there

is

no

market · for

the

aragonite uncovered by Defendant-Appellants activities, and
that to grant damages as a result of covering up potential
deposits

of

aragonite

where

there

is

no

market

for

the

aragonite uncovered seems incomprehensible.

-

01

POINT V

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

SHOULD NOT BE

OBLIGATED

TO

MAKE

PAYMENT ON THE SALE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE SOLD TO MINING AND
ENERGY

LEASING

CORPORATION,

A

UTAH

CORPORATION

WITHOUT

ACKNOWLEDGING SAID OBLIGATION IN WRITING.
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Utah Code Annotated at 25-5-4 states:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith: •

(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another."
It is clear
that

the

truck

(Transcript page 84, lines 2 through 23),
in question was being

Energy Leasing Corporation,
time

has

a

Defendant-Appellant

indicating

that

Utah corporation and at no
signed

he would answer

Energy Leasing Corporation

sold to Mining and

for

a

written

the

debts

(Transcript page

214

document
of Mining
lines 25,

page 215 lines 1, 2).

SUMMARY

In summary Defendant-Appellant alleges that PlaintiffRespondent did not have standing to bring the action because
of a

failure to comply with the terms of the Contract by

giving the required written notice, and that said contract
was void or voidable as a result of a lack of consideration
pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement and therefore
unenforcable

by

the

Plaintiff-Respondent.

Defendant-

Appellant alleges further that the judgment awarded by the
District

Court,

as

a

result

of

the

placement

of

the

overburden is excessive in that the poten~ial deposits of
aragonite allegedly covered by the Defendant-Appellant have
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no market value and Plaintiff-Respondent made no attempt to
mitigate his

damages

said overburden.

in connection with the placement of

Further

that

Defendant-Appellant

should

not be responsible for payment of the truck in question as a
result of not signing a written agreement stating that he
would answer for the debts or liability of another.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

:( :(_ day of

1982.

GERALD M. CONDER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two copies of the following Brief
were hand delivered to Steven Alder, attorney for the
Plaintiff, at Ten Exchange ?lace, ilOOO, Salt Lake City Utah
84111, this ;(~day of
~
, 1982.
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